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The Supreme Court shaped its approach to charitable solicitation in a trilogy of cases in the 
1980s: Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment (1980), Secretary of State of 
Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co. (1984), and Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of 
North Carolina (1988).  Owing largely to ambiguity surrounding the concepts of content 
analysis, tiered scrutiny, and commercial speech emerging during that era, the Court failed to 
articulate a coherent framework for evaluating regulations of charitable solicitation. The result 
has left the Court without a clear rationale for the value of charitable solicitation and lower 
courts without a workable test for evaluating regulations affecting this form of speech: the 
Eighth and Tenth Circuits interpret Schaumburg as an intermediate scrutiny test, the Third and 
Eleventh Circuits view it as a strict scrutiny test, and the Fourth Circuit has simply noted that the 
Court has been “unclear” about the appropriate standard. 
After examining the Court’s approach to charitable solicitation, I propose a new test that 
incorporates current notions of content analysis and tiered scrutiny and better accounts for the 
speaker-based interests tied to charitable solicitation.  My normative approach adopts a “civic 
conception of free speech” that is cognizant of the matters of public concern advanced both 
directly and indirectly through charitable solicitation.  I conclude that a balancing of interests 
offers a more appropriate review of charitable solicitation regulation than the cumbersome 
formulations arising out of the Schaumburg trilogy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court shaped its approach to charitable solicitation in 
a trilogy of cases in the 1980s: Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a 
Better Environment,1 Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. 
Munson Co.,2 and Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North 
Carolina.3  Owing largely to ambiguity surrounding the concepts of 
content analysis, tiered scrutiny, and commercial speech emerging 
during that era, the Court failed to articulate a coherent framework for 
evaluating regulations of charitable solicitation. The result has left lower 
courts unable to judge “the ends which the several rules seek to 
accomplish, the reasons why those ends are desired, what is given up to 
gain them, and whether they are worth the price.”4  The Eighth and 
Tenth Circuits interpret Schaumburg as an intermediate scrutiny test, 
the Third and Eleventh Circuits view it as a strict scrutiny test, and the 
Fourth Circuit has simply noted that the Court has been “unclear” 
about the appropriate standard. The lack of doctrinal coherence has also 
left an important form of speech without adequate First Amendment 
protections. 
My objective in this Article is to articulate a framework for 
reviewing charitable solicitation regulation that better accounts for the 
important democratic values of this kind of speech.  This requires 
1. 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
2. 467 U.S. 947 (1984). 
3. 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
4. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897), reprinted 
in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 1007 (1997). 
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understanding the relationship between charitable solicitation and 
related First Amendment concepts.  I begin by reviewing the state of 
three of these concepts—content analysis, tiered scrutiny, and 
commercial speech—when the Court decided Schaumburg in 1980.  In 
Part III, I review the Court’s charitable solicitation decisions.  Part IV 
proposes an alternative test to that constructed under the Schaumburg-
Munson-Riley trilogy.  My normative approach accounts for the 
speaker-based interests related to charitable solicitation and builds upon 
a “civic conception of free speech” that better ensures “broad 
communication about matters of public concern” advanced both directly 
and indirectly through charitable solicitation.5  I contend that a 
balancing of interests rooted in a concern for democratic discourse 
offers a more principled and more cogent review of charitable 
solicitation regulation than the cumbersome formulations applied today. 
II.  CONTENT ANALYSIS, TIERED SCRUTINY, AND COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH 
Content analysis6 and tiered scrutiny7 emerged independently of one 
another in First Amendment law.  The latter originated in the equal 
protection context: by the early 1970s, commentators had observed that 
the Court applied strict scrutiny to classifications that were suspect or 
involved a fundamental interest while subjecting all other statutes to a 
“standard of minimal rationality.”8  Because speech was deemed to be a 
5. CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 19, 28 (2d ed. 
1995). 
6. Government regulation of expressive activity is content-neutral when justified without 
reference to the content of speech.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).  
Whether a restriction is content-based or content-neutral is not always readily discernible.  
See Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-Based 
and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 809 (2004) 
(“[T]he distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws is too amorphous to 
serve as a determinative test of constitutionality.”); see also Martin H. Redish, The Content 
Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981) (the use of content 
distinction is “both theoretically questionable and difficult to apply”); Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 107 (1978) (“[S]ince content-neutral, like content-based, restrictions 
may at times have a differential impact or reflect a latent government hostility toward certain 
ideas, the differences between these two types of restrictions often seem to be differences 
more of degree than of kind.”). 
7. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (strict 
scrutiny); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (intermediate scrutiny). 
8. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (“The Warren 
Court embraced a rigid two-tier attitude.  Some situations evoked the aggressive ‘new’ equal 
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fundamental liberty interest under the First Amendment, the Court 
evaluated regulations of most forms of speech under strict scrutiny.9 
As the Court assimilated tiered scrutiny into its First Amendment 
doctrine, it limited its application of strict scrutiny to regulations that 
discriminated based upon the content of speech.  This distinction first 
appeared in the 1972 decision Police Department of City of Chicago v. 
Mosley, which involved a Chicago ordinance prohibiting picketing or 
demonstrating on a public way within 150 feet of any school but 
exempting “the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor 
dispute.”10  Mosley challenged the ordinance on equal protection 
grounds, and the Court rejected the City’s distinction between labor 
picketing and other peaceful picketing.11  Regulations based on content 
were “never permitted”12 and would be subjected to a high degree of 
scrutiny.13 
protection, with scrutiny that was ‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the 
deferential ‘old’ equal protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none 
in fact.”). 
9. The Court made an important distinction in 1942 when it clarified that categories of 
speech were either protected or unprotected.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 
571–72 (1942).  Regulations of speech in the latter category were of little constitutional 
concern.  Id. (“[S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of 
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”); see also LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 670 (1st ed. 1978) (“From the dictum in 
Chaplinsky the Supreme Court had gradually derived what became known as the two-level 
theory of the first amendment, recognizing speech at one level as fully entitled to first 
amendment protection and relegating to a lower level speech so worthless as to be beyond the 
constitutional ken.”). 
10. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 93 (1972).  Stephen Gottlieb contends 
that Mosley “reinterpreted [past] cases in terms of the obligation of government to remain 
neutral with respect to the content of speech.”  Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Speech Clause and 
the Limits of Neutrality, 51 ALB. L. REV. 19, 24 (1986). 
11. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 94. 
12. Id. at 99.  Noting that “the equal protection claim in this case is closely intertwined 
with First Amendment interests,” the Court concluded that “[t]he central problem with 
Chicago’s ordinance is that it describes permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter.”  
Id. at 95, 99. 
13. Kenneth Karst has observed that Mosley marked the Court’s first full 
acknowledgment that a content-based regulation was particularly odious because it violated 
“the principle of equal liberty of expression . . . inherent in the first amendment.”  Kenneth L. 
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 26 
(1975).  Karst contends that “[t]he absence of a clear articulation of the principle of equal 
liberty of expression in Supreme Court decisions before Mosley may be attributable to a 
belief that the principle is so obviously central among first amendment values that it requires 
no explanation.”  Id. at 29. 
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Contemporaneously with Mosley, the Court reconsidered its two-
fold regime of strict and rational basis scrutiny.  Writing of the 1971 
Term that included Mosley, Gerald Gunther suggested that there was 
“mounting discontent” with two-tiered scrutiny and that the Court was 
prepared to intervene in some circumstances with something less than 
strict scrutiny.14  Gunther presaged that an “intensified means scrutiny 
would, in short, close the wide gap between the strict scrutiny of the new 
equal protection and the minimal scrutiny of the old not by abandoning 
the strict but by raising the level of the minimal from virtual abdication 
to genuine judicial inquiry.”15 
Gunther’s prediction of an emerging intermediate scrutiny was 
consistent with the adumbrations of the Court’s 1968 decision in United 
States v. O’Brien.16  O’Brien, a case involving “expressive conduct,” 
announced a previously unseen standard of review: 
 
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is 
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it 
furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest.17 
 
Writing about O’Brien in 1975, John Hart Ely commented: “[T]he 
Court is surely to be commended for here attempting something it 
14. Gunther, supra note 8, at 12. 
15. Id. at 24.  Several years after Gunther’s article, the Court began extending a lesser 
degree of scrutiny toward speech regulations that it concluded were not based on content.  In 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Court 
noted that it had “often approved” time, place, and manner restrictions “provided that they 
are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a 
significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.”  425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (emphasis added).  
The term “content-neutral” also entered the Court’s lexicon.  See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 
348, 368 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to a “content-neutral time, place, and 
manner restriction”); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 84 (1976) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (same). 
16. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
17. Id.  This new test was consistent with the jurisprudential developments in equal 
protection analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 
495, 503–04 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1971). 
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attempts too seldom, the statement of a coherent and applicable test.”18  
But Ely observed that O’Brien’s language revealed an ambiguity in the 
Court’s strict scrutiny test.19  Prior to O’Brien, strict scrutiny review 
upheld a speech regulation only if there were no “less restrictive means” 
available.20  Ely noted that this phrase could be either strongly or weakly 
construed.21  Strongly construed, the test would invalidate almost any 
regulation because, as Justice Blackmun observed four years later, “[a] 
judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with 
something a little less ‘drastic’ or a little less ‘restrictive’ in almost any 
situation.”22  Weakly construed, some regulations would survive 
review.23 O’Brien substituted the phrase “no greater than is essential” 
for “less restrictive means”24 and upheld the defendant’s criminal 
conviction for violating a speech regulation.25  Ely concluded that the 
analysis and result were consistent with the weak formulation of strict 
scrutiny.26  He suggested that this weak formulation “turned out to be 
no protection at all,” and he equated O’Brien’s review to rational basis 
scrutiny.27  Here, his otherwise trenchant analysis was exaggerated.  The 
plain language of O’Brien indicated something beyond minimal 
18. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1484 (1975).  Ely 
foreshadowed a broad applicability of the new test, observing that O’Brien’s standard was 
“not limited to cases involving so-called ‘symbolic speech.’”  Id. 
19. According to Ely, the fourth prong of O’Brien’s test “involves a choice between 
different conceptions of [the ‘no greater than is essential’] standard, a choice made by 
reference to factors neither O’Brien nor any other Supreme Court decision has yet made 
explicit.”  Id. 
20. Id. at 1484–85. 
21. Id. 
22. Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188 (1979)  
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
23. Ely wrote that “this weak formulation would reach only laws that engage in the 
gratuitous inhibition of expression, requiring only that a prohibition not outrun the interest it 
is designed to serve.”  Ely, supra note 18, at 1485. 
24. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
25. Id. 
26. “Further language in the O’Brien opinion, and the holding of the case, indicate that 
[the weak formulation] is the strongest form of less restrictive alternative analysis in which, 
under the circumstances, the Court was prepared to engage.”  Ely, supra note 18, at 1485. 
27. Id. at 1486 n.18. 
28. In 1984, the Court characterized O’Brien as “little, if any, different from the 
[intermediate scrutiny] standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions.”  Clark v. 
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984); see also Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797–98 (1989). 
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of review that was less than strict scrutiny but greater than rational basis 
review.29 
Although the Court initially failed to classify O’Brien as an 
intermediate scrutiny test, it tightened its strict scrutiny definition in two 
First Amendment decisions issued the year after Ely’s article, 
supplanting the settled “less restrictive means” with the previously 
unseen “least restrictive means.”30 The slight language shift ensured that 
the Court’s strict scrutiny test was no longer vulnerable to the weak 
formulation that Ely had exposed. 
Ely observed that O’Brien’s crucial inquiry was its second prong—
whether the governmental interest was unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression.31  A regulation that failed to satisfy this prong was not 
per se unconstitutional, but the Court’s analysis would be “switched 
onto another track.”32  That other track was strict scrutiny.33  The 
conclusion that a regulation related to the suppression of free expression 
(i.e., a content-based regulation) required strict scrutiny was the same 
29. A similar development was evolving more explicitly in the Court’s equal protection 
analysis.  A 1977 Note in the Harvard Law Review observed that “[m]any commentators 
ha[d] noted the emergence from the Supreme Court of an intermediate standard of scrutiny 
in equal protection analysis, more deferential than the ‘strict scrutiny’ exercised in challenges 
to suspect classifications and classifications impinging on fundamental rights, but more 
exacting than the ‘rational basis’ test traditionally applied to economic and social welfare 
legislation.”  Note, Intermediate Standard of Review, 91 HARV. L. REV. 177, 177 (1977).  
Although this intermediate scrutiny in equal protection analysis was strikingly similar to the 
new O’Brien standard for expressive speech jurisprudence, the Court had not yet linked the 
concepts when it decided Schaumburg. 
30. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372 (1976) (“Though there is a vital need for 
government efficiency and effectiveness, such dismissals are on balance not the least 
restrictive means for fostering that end.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) 
(“[D]isclosure requirements—certainly in most applications—appear to be the least 
restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress 
found to exist”).  Buckley and Elrod were the Court’s earliest uses of the phrase “least 
restrictive means.”  Three years later, in Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers 
Party, the Court asserted that it had previously “required that States adopt the least drastic 
means to achieve their ends.”  440 U.S. 173, 185 (1979).  The Court supported this somewhat 
apocryphal claim by citing two previous decisions: Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974), 
and Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31–33 (1968).  Rhodes contained no discussion about the 
burden that a regulation could place on a protected interest.  Lubin noted that a “legitimate 
state interest . . . must be achieved by a means that does not unfairly or unnecessarily 
burden . . . an . . . important interest.”  415 U.S. at 716.  Neither case supported the principle 
that strict scrutiny required the “least drastic means.” 
31. Ely, supra note 18, at 1484. 
32. Id.  Tribe uses the “track” terminology in his analysis of communication and 
expression.  TRIBE, supra note 9, at 580–688. 
33. Ely, supra note 18, at 1484. 
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conclusion that Mosley had reached.34  But Mosley had failed to 
distinguish O’Brien’s more relaxed test from strict scrutiny.  Ely clarified 
the distinction by inferring not only the connection between content-
based regulation and strict scrutiny but also its converse: content-neutral 
regulations were subject to something less than strict scrutiny.35  The 
Court, however, had not yet adopted the term “intermediate scrutiny,” 
and the litmus for content-neutrality had not yet become whether a 
regulation was unrelated to the suppression of free expression.36  Ely’s 
analytical prescience about the link between content-neutrality and 
intermediate scrutiny likely went unrecognized because the relevant 
descriptive terms were not yet embedded in the Court’s vernacular. 
The terminology, however, was close at hand.  In 1978, Laurence 
Tribe observed that “[w]here government aims at the 
noncommunicative impact of an act [i.e., when the regulation is not 
content-based], the correct result in any particular case thus reflects 
some ‘balancing’ of the competing interests.”37  Several months later, 
Geoffrey Stone, in the first of three articles that tracked the 
development of the Court’s content analysis doctrine in the 1970s and 
the 1980s, explained that “[g]overnmental restrictions of expression may 
be divided into two general categories—content-neutral restrictions and 
content-based restrictions.”38  Stone observed that the Court subjected 
content-based restrictions of “fully protected” expression to “a 
stringently speech-protective set of standards” and upheld such 
regulations “in only the most extraordinary circumstances.”39  
Conversely, the Court reviewed content-neutral restrictions with “a 
balancing of first amendment interests against competing government 
concerns.”40  Thus, only two years before the Court’s landmark 
charitable solicitation decision in Schaumburg, commentators had 
34. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972). 
35. Ely, supra note 18, at 1484. 
36. The Court clarified the latter in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1989). 
37. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 581.  Tribe traces the roots of the academic debate between 
absolutist protection and balancing to the early 1960s.  See id. at 582–83 n.19. 
38. Stone, supra note 6, at 81.  The other two articles are Geoffrey R. Stone, Content 
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983), and Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987). 
39. Stone, supra note 6, at 82. 
40. Id. at 81; see also Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A 
Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 762 (1980) (Review of content-neutral regulation “consists 
of a middle-tier equal protection test, similar to that used in cases of discrimination on the 
basis of gender or illegitimacy, coupled with a controlled balancing test.”). 
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zeroed in on the emergence of an intermediate scrutiny balancing test 
for content-neutral regulations of protected speech. 
One other emerging concept affected the context in which the Court 
examined Schaumburg: commercial speech analysis, “a notoriously 
unstable and contentious domain of First Amendment jurisprudence.”41  
Since its 1942 decision in Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Court had viewed 
commercial speech as unprotected.42  In the mid-1970s, the Court 
reversed this classification in two decisions, Bigelow v. Virginia43 and 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc.44  After Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court protected 
commercial speech, but the degree of that protection remained unclear 
because commercial speech was not “wholly undifferentiable from other 
forms” of speech.45  As Justice  Powell elaborated in Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n: 
 
To require a parity of constitutional protection for 
commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite 
dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the 
Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the latter kind 
of speech.  Rather than subject the First Amendment to 
such a devitalization, we instead have afforded 
commercial speech a limited measure of protection, 
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale 
of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of 
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of 
noncommercial expression.46 
 
Commercial speech, then, although within the realm of First 
Amendment protection, was something less than fully protected speech.  
The distinction created a conundrum.  Under the old two-tiered 
scrutiny, the Court subjected regulation of protected speech to strict 
scrutiny and regulation of unprotected speech to rational basis scrutiny.  
41. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 
(2000). 
42. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“[T]he Constitution imposes no such restraint on government 
as respects purely commercial advertising.”), overruled by Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
43. 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975). 
44. 425 U.S. 748, 780 (1976). 
45. Id. at 771 n.24. 
46. 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). 
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With the advent of content analysis, the Court applied a form of 
intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral regulation of protected speech.  
But what about content-neutral regulation of commercial speech?  No 
longer unprotected, commercial speech merited something other than 
rational basis scrutiny.  But because commercial speech was not “wholly 
undifferentiable” from other forms of protected speech, it did not 
warrant the same degree of protection as these other forms. 
III. THE CHARITABLE SOLICITATION CASES 
The appearance of content analysis, tiered scrutiny, and a new 
understanding to commercial speech during the 1970s provided the 
context in which the Court formulated its approach to charitable 
solicitation in Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley.  I now turn to these 
cases. 
A. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment 
Schaumburg addressed a city ordinance that prohibited door-to-door 
or on-street solicitation by an organization that did not use at least 75% 
of donations for “charitable purposes.”47  The Village of Schaumburg 
offered three justifications for its regulation: policing fraud, protecting 
public safety and protecting residential privacy.48  The Court concluded 
that the “legitimate interest” in preventing fraud “[could] be better 
served by measures less intrusive than a direct prohibition on 
solicitation,”49 and found no “substantial relationship” between the 75% 
requirement and the protection of public safety or residential privacy.50  
The village’s interests were thus only “peripherally promoted” by the 
47. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 622–23 (1980).  The 
ordinance regulated “peddlers and solicitors,” who were defined as “any persons who, going 
from place to place without appointment, offer goods or services for sale or take orders for 
future delivery of goods or services.”  Id. at 622 n.1.  The Court devoted the bulk of its 
analysis to the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine and held that the Village’s ordinance 
was unconstitutionally overbroad.  Id. at 635.  The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine 
traces its roots to Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863 (1991).  The doctrine permits someone 
whose conduct may be legitimately proscribed to challenge the proscription as it applies to 
others.  Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 634; see Fallon, supra, at 863–67.  Because overbreadth is an 
“ancillary” doctrine that comports with the Court’s more substantive doctrines like content 
analysis, see id. at 866–67 (citing David S. Bogen, First Amendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 
MD. L. REV. 679, 681 (1978)), Schaumburg’s principles are applicable outside the overbreadth 
context. 
48. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636, 638. 
49. Id. at 637. 
50. Id. at 638. 
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limitation and “could be sufficiently served by measures less destructive 
of First Amendment interests.”51  Although the Court never synthesized 
these observations in Schaumburg, its underlying test might be 
formulated as follows: 
 
A direct and substantial regulation of door-to-door or 
on-street charitable solicitation will be sustained if it 
serves sufficiently strong, subordinating interests by 
means of narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve 
those interests without unnecessarily interfering with 
First Amendment freedoms.52 
 
Four months after Schaumburg, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice 
Blackmun, asserted in his dissent in Carey v. Brown that Schaumburg 
had articulated a content-neutral intermediate scrutiny test.53  At least 
one lower court reached the same interpretation that year,54 as did 
Professor Stone in an article published three years later.55 
B. Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co. 
Four years after Schaumburg, the Court revisited restrictions on 
charitable solicitation in Munson.56  The Maryland statute at issue in 
Munson, like the Schaumburg ordinance, limited the percentage of 
charitable solicitations that charities could spend on fundraising costs.57  
51. Id. at 636. 
52. This phrasing is derived from Stone’s characterization of Schaumburg’s test.  See 
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 38, at 49–50. 
53. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 476–77 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing 
Schaumburg for the proposition that the Court “has upheld state authority to restrict the 
time, place, and manner of speech, if those regulations ‘protect a substantial government 
interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression’ and are narrowly tailored, limiting 
the restrictions to those reasonably necessary to protect the substantial governmental 
interest”). 
54. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. City of Houston, 620 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. App. 
1981) (citing Schaumburg for the notion that “[r]easonable restrictions on the time, place and 
manner of the exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights will be upheld if they are 
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech and are narrowly drawn, 
limiting the restrictions to those necessary to protect significant governmental interests”). 
55. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 38, at 245 
(intimating that the ordinance in Schaumburg was a content-neutral, speaker-based 
restriction). 
56. Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984). 
57. Id. at 950.  Unlike the Schaumburg ordinance, the Maryland statute included a 
discretionary provision under which the Secretary of State could license a charity whose 
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The statute, however, covered any “fund-raising activity” rather than 
simply door-to-door and on-street solicitation.58  The plaintiff, a 
professional charitable solicitor, asserted that the statute violated his 
rights to free speech and assembly.59 
Munson relied heavily on Schaumburg.  Justice Blackmun explained 
for the Court that the government restriction in Schaumburg had not 
been “a precisely tailored means” and had borne “no necessary 
connection” to the Village’s asserted interests.60  Because these phrases, 
absent from Schaumburg, were not strict scrutiny terms, it appeared that 
Munson was cryptically endorsing Schaumburg as an intermediate 
scrutiny test.  But Munson then cited Schaumburg for the strict scrutiny 
proposition that certain statutes would be invalidated if they “[did] not 
employ means narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest.”61  Schaumburg had asserted that a restriction had to be 
“narrowly drawn”62 but had never used the strict scrutiny phrase 
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”  
Munson thus recharacterized Schaumburg’s test as akin to strict 
scrutiny,63 approximating the following: 
 
A direct and substantial regulation of charitable 
solicitation will be sustained if it furthers a compelling 
governmental interest, and if the regulation is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest and does not unnecessarily 
interfere with First Amendment freedoms.64 
 
Following Munson, a federal district judge,65 a federal appellate 
judge,66 and the Supreme Court of Maine67 cited Schaumburg for the 
fundraising expenditures exceeded the statutory cap if enforcing the cap would “effectively 
prevent the charitable organization from raising contributions.”  Id. at 962. 
58. Id. at 950 n.2.  In addition to door-to-door solicitation, any “fund-raising activity” 
presumably encompasses solicitation ranging from telemarketing to newspaper 
advertisements.  At least one of the governmental interests in Schaumburg, protecting public 
safety, fails to justify restrictions on these other forms of fundraising. 
59. Id. at 950, 952. 
60. Id. at 961. 
61. Id. at 965 n.13. 
62. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980). 
63. Like Schaumburg, Munson never addressed whether the Maryland regulation was 
content-neutral or content-based. 
64. This formulation approximates the standards articulated or implied by Munson. 
65. See Hornstein v. Hartigan, 676 F. Supp. 894, 897 (C.D. Ill. 1988) (citing Schaumburg 
for the principle that even a compelling interest “must be drawn with the least restriction on 
First Amendment freedoms”). 
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strict scrutiny principle that a regulation must be the “least restrictive 
means” available to accomplish a legislative purpose, a strict scrutiny 
interpretation that exceeded even Munson’s recharacterization of 
Schaumburg.  Conversely, Stone, in an oft-cited article on content 
analysis, adhered to his earlier assessment that Schaumburg articulated 
an intermediate scrutiny test for a content-neutral regulation.68  The 
confusion stemming from the convergence of tiered scrutiny and content 
analysis in evaluation of charitable solicitation regulation was becoming 
evident. 
C. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc. 
Four years after Munson, the Court examined three provisions in the 
North Carolina Charitable Solicitations Act, which directly regulated 
professional charitable solicitors.69  Turning first to a requirement that 
the percentage of contributions retained by professional charitable 
solicitors be “reasonable,” Justice Brennan began by reviewing 
Schaumburg and Munson.70  Justice Brennan noted that Munson had 
applied “exacting First Amendment scrutiny,”71 and concluded that 
Schaumburg and Munson “teach that the solicitation of charitable 
contributions is protected speech, and that using percentages to decide 
the legality of the fundraiser’s fee is not narrowly tailored to the State’s 
66. See Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 758 F.2d 350, 359 (9th Cir. 1984) (Norris, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Schaumburg in the context of strict scrutiny 
for the principle that a state “must demonstrate that [a] regulation is ‘the least restrictive 
means available that would accomplish the legislative purpose’”). 
67. See State v. Me. State Troopers Ass’n, 491 A.2d 538, 542 (Me. 1985) (citing 
Schaumburg for the principle that a law “must be narrowly drawn so that it is the least 
restrictive means of achieving the compelling government interest”). 
68. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 38, at 49–50.  Stone considered 
Schaumburg to correspond to a test of intermediate scrutiny under which “the Court takes 
seriously the inquiries into the substantiality of the governmental interest and the availability 
of less restrictive alternatives.”  Id. at 52.  Under this intermediate standard of review, “the 
government cannot satisfy the less restrictive alternative requirement merely by 
demonstrating that less restrictive measures would serve its ends ‘less effectively’ than the 
challenged regulation.  Rather, to withstand intermediate scrutiny, the government must 
prove that its use of a less restrictive alternative would seriously undermine substantial 
governmental interests.”  Id. at 53. 
69. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).  Unlike the regulations 
in Schaumburg and Munson, the North Carolina statute was explicitly limited to professional 
solicitors.  Id. at 784 n.2. 
70. Id. at 787–89. 
71. Id. at 789. 
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interest in preventing fraud.”72  The Court held that the reasonable fee 
provision was unconstitutional under this standard.73 
Addressing next a requirement in the statute that professional 
solicitors make certain disclosures, Justice Brennan abruptly concluded 
that the provision was a content-based regulation because “[m]andating 
speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the 
content of the speech.”74  This perfunctory conclusion was the first time 
that the Court had explicitly applied content analysis to a charitable 
solicitation regulation.  Justice Brennan then noted that “North 
Carolina’s content-based regulation [was] subject to exacting First 
Amendment scrutiny.”75 
The Court concluded that the disclosure provision was 
unconstitutional because the means chosen to accomplish the State’s 
interest in informing donors were “unduly burdensome and not 
narrowly tailored.”76  Justice Brennan’s choice of wording here is 
curiously vague.  When Riley was decided in 1988, it was settled doctrine 
that courts applied strict scrutiny to a content-based regulation of 
protected speech.77  But rather than follow this standard, Justice 
Brennan hedged with the phrase “exacting scrutiny” and avoided the 
familiar terms of “compelling interest” and “least restrictive means.”78  
The Court was either deliberately carving out a unique standard of 
review for content-based regulation of charitable solicitation or 
unnecessarily perpetuating ambiguity and imprecision.  Riley made 
clear, however, that whatever exacting scrutiny meant, it was the test 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 795. 
75. Id. at 798. 
76. Id.  The Court opined that “[i]n contrast to the prophylactic, imprecise, and unduly 
burdensome rule the State has adopted to reduce its alleged donor misperception, more 
benign and narrowly tailored options are available.”  Id. at 800. 
77. See, e.g., Marc Rohr, Freedom of Speech After Justice Brennan, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. 
L. REV. 413, 449–50 (1993) (“The period of the early 1980’s [sic] marked the beginning of the 
relatively consistent practices, by the Supreme Court, of clearly distinguishing between 
content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech.”). 
78. Although the majority in Riley never used the term strict scrutiny, Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissent classified the majority’s test as such.  Riley, 487 U.S. at 810–11 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)  (“The Court concludes, after a lengthy discussion of the 
constitutionality of ‘compelled statements,’ that strict scrutiny should be applied and that the 
statute does not survive that scrutiny.”). 
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that the Court had used in Munson, and by implication, in 
Schaumburg.79 
Riley added an additional wrinkle in its analysis of the disclosure 
provision.  Having concluded that “[m]andating speech that a speaker 
would not otherwise make” rendered a regulation content-based,80 Riley 
appeared to have announced that any disclosure provision would be 
subjected to exacting scrutiny.  But Justice Brennan then cited two 
examples of compelled disclosures that would be constitutionally 
permissible—requiring financial disclosure reports81 and requiring that a 
professional solicitor disclose his or her professional status.82  The latter 
exception drew disagreement from Justice Scalia, who observed that it  
 
represent[ed] a departure from our traditional 
understanding, embodied in the First Amendment, that 
where the dissemination of ideas is concerned, it is safer 
to assume that the people are smart enough to get the 
information they need than to assume that the 
government is wise or impartial enough to make the 
judgment for them.83 
D. Revisiting Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley 
Not surprisingly, the federal appellate courts have split in their 
interpretations of Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley.  The Eighth84 and 
79. Compare id. at 789 (The Court used “exacting scrutiny” in Munson.) with id. at 798 
(North Carolina’s content-based regulation is subject to “exacting First Amendment 
scrutiny.”). 
80. Id. at 795. 
81. Id. at 788.  Riley noted that Schaumburg had observed that the government would 
have been free to require charities to file financial disclosure reports.  Id.  Leslie Espinoza 
asserts that Schaumburg took 
 
an absolutist first amendment approach to fund-raising disclosure statutes, 
leaving no room for the Court to balance the potentially different 
regulatory interests in charitable solicitation as opposed to charitable 
advocacy.  Backed into a corner, the Court issued an internally 
contradictory opinion on disclosure and left little opportunity for states to 
develop appropriate regulation. 
Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality of Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for Informed 
Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 612 (1991). 
82. Riley, 487 U.S. at 799 n.11. 
83. Id. at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
84. See Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591, 597 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(“Although the Supreme Court has not specified whether the Schaumburg test is an 
intermediate scrutiny review of a content-neutral regulation, we have interpreted it as such.”) 
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Tenth85 Circuits have concluded that Schaumburg established a test of 
intermediate scrutiny for a content-neutral regulation.  Conversely, the 
Third86 and Eleventh87 Circuits have cited Schaumburg for the modern 
strict scrutiny test.  The Fourth Circuit has recently announced that “[i]t 
is unclear” whether the Court’s standard amounts to strict scrutiny or 
intermediate scrutiny.88  The confusion is equally apparent in the trial 
courts.89 
I turn now to the possible reasons for the Court’s confusing guidance 
in its charitable solicitation cases.  Schaumburg’s difficulties begin with 
its failure to address content analysis and tiered scrutiny, even though 
both concepts were squarely before the Court.  The Village of 
Schaumburg asserted in its reply brief that its ordinance should not face 
strict scrutiny because it was “[neutral] on its face and neutral in its 
(citing Pryor, 258 F.3d at 851); Nat’l Fed. of the Blind of Ark., Inc. v. Pryor, 258 F.3d 851, 
854–55 (8th Cir. 2001) (comparing Schaumburg to Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 
781 (1989)).  But see Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 689 (8th Cir. 
1992) (noting that Sable Commc’n of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989), quoted 
Schaumburg as part of its strict scrutiny formulation). 
85. See Am. Target Adver., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing 
Schaumburg for intermediate scrutiny test of content-neutral regulation). 
86. See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Schaumburg for the 
proposition that “[a]s in all areas of constitutional strict scrutiny jurisprudence, the 
government must establish that the challenged statute is narrowly tailored to meet a 
compelling state interest, and that it seeks to protect its interest in a manner that is the least 
restrictive of protected speech”) vacated by Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); see also 
United States v. Local 560 (I.B.T.), 974 F.2d 315, 344 (3d Cir. 1992) (characterizing 
Schaumburg as having struck down “a content-based restriction on door-to-door solicitation 
because restriction was not sufficiently narrowly tailored”). 
87. See Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 
1542 n.34 (11th Cir. 1993) (“We believe the same can be said with respect to Village of 
Schaumburg and the other strict scrutiny cases relied upon by the city.” (citation omitted)). 
88. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331, 338 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005).  Curiously, the 
court concluded that “[r]egardless of the label, the substance of the test is clear.”  Id.  Cf. 
Famine Relief Fund v. West Virginia, 905 F.2d 747, 754 (4th Cir. 1990); Telco Commc’n, Inc. 
v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1989).  The Ninth Circuit has cited Schaumburg in 
addressing charitable solicitation regulation but has not explicitly characterized the case 
under content analysis or tiered scrutiny.  See Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 788 
(9th Cir. 1993) (Schaumburg and other cases hold that solicitation of charitable contributions 
is protected speech, and “restrictions on solicitation in traditional public forums must be 
narrowly drawn to serve a compelling government interest.”). 
89. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1296 (M.D. Fla. 
2004) (citing Schaumburg as intermediate scrutiny test); Fraternal Order of Police v. 
Stenehjem, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1029, 1030 (D.N.D. 2003) (relying on Schaumburg and 
asserting both that “[t]he statute does not have to be the least restrictive means of regulation” 
and that the restriction “must withstand strict scrutiny”); Tenn. Law Enforcement Youth 
Found., Inc. v. Millsaps, No. 89-2762-G, 1991 WL 523878, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 3, 1991) 
(citing Schaumburg as strict scrutiny test). 
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administration.”90  The Village cited Virginia Board of Pharmacy for the 
proposition that “[r]estrictions on the time, place or manner of 
expression are permissible provided that ‘they are imposed without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a 
significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.’”91  
Conversely, the nonprofit group Citizens for a Better Environment 
contended that “[o]nly a narrowly-drawn ordinance that serves a 
compelling state interest with narrow specificity and is closely drawn to 
avoid unnecessary abridgment can survive the exacting scrutiny 
necessitated by a state-imposed restriction on freedom of speech.”92  In 
essence, then, the parties asked the Court to decide whether the 
relevant standard of review was strict or intermediate scrutiny.  But 
rather than employing the standards briefed by the parties, the Court 
ignored content analysis altogether and sidestepped the debate over 
whether strict scrutiny was warranted. 
The Court’s lack of clarity may be partially attributable to the views 
about tiered scrutiny held by the Justices central to the development of 
its approach to charitable solicitation.  Four Justices were in the 
majorities of all three major cases: Justice White (the author of 
Schaumburg), Justice Blackmun (who authored Munson), Justice 
Brennan (who authored Riley), and Justice Marshall.93  Two years 
before Schaumburg, these same four Justices had expressed their 
reservations about tiered scrutiny in the landmark affirmative action 
90. Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 6, Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 
U.S. 620 (1980) (No. 78-1335). 
91. Id. at 12 (citing Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). 
92. Respondents’ Brief at 14, Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620 (No. 78-1335) (internal 
quotations omitted).  The Village countered that “[t]he cases cited by the respondents in their 
brief simply do not lend any credence to the concept that an ordinance regulating the 
solicitation of funds is subject to strict scrutiny.”  Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 90, at 
10. 
93. Schaumburg was an 8-1 decision in 1980, with only Justice Rehnquist dissenting.  
Justice O’Connor replaced Justice Stewart in 1981.  Munson was decided in 1984 by a 5-4 
margin, with Justice Stevens concurring and Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and 
O’Connor joining Justice Rehnquist in dissent.  Justice Burger’s departure in 1986 resulted in 
Justice Rehnquist’s elevation to Chief Justice and Justice Scalia’s introduction to the Court.  
The following year, Justice Kennedy replaced Justice Powell.  In 1988, Riley was a more 
fractured decision with Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Kennedy fully joining Justice 
Brennan’s majority opinion.  Although Justice Stevens joined the majority in Schaumburg 
and Munson and most of the Court’s opinion in Riley, his concurrence in Munson 
distinguishes him from the other four Justices in all three majorities. 
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case Regents of University of California v. Bakke.94  In their joint partial 
concurrence, the Justices found it “necessary to define with precision 
the meaning of that inexact term, ‘strict scrutiny.’”95  They contended 
that “a government practice or statute which restricts ‘fundamental 
rights’ or which contains ‘suspect classifications’ is to be subjected to 
‘strict scrutiny’ and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling 
government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive 
alternative is available.”96  But wary of endorsing tiered scrutiny, the 
Justices made clear that “[w]e do not pause to debate whether our cases 
establish a ‘two-tier’ analysis, a ‘sliding scale’ analysis, or something else 
altogether” because “[i]t is enough for present purposes that strict 
scrutiny is applied at least in some cases.”97 
The following year, Justice Blackmun distanced himself from his 
qualified recognition of strict scrutiny in Bakke.  Concurring in Illinois 
State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,98 Justice Blackmun 
lamented the Court’s ongoing efforts to clarify strict scrutiny: 
 
I have never been able fully to appreciate just what a 
“compelling state interest” is. . . . And, for me, “least 
drastic means” is a slippery slope and also the signal of 
the result the Court has chosen to reach.  A judge would 
be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with 
something a little less “drastic” or a little less 
“restrictive” in almost any situation, and thereby enable 
himself to vote to strike legislation down.  This is 
reminiscent of the Court’s indulgence, a few decades ago, 
in substantive due process in the economic area as a 
means of nullification. 
 
I feel, therefore, and have always felt, that these 
phrases are really not very helpful for constitutional 
94. 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, J.J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 357 n.30.  Two months prior to Bakke, Justice White, joined by Justices 
Marshall and Brennan, had derided any attempt by the Court to recalculate a legislative 
balancing of interests.  See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804 (1978) 
(White, J., dissenting) (“What is inexplicable, is for the Court to substitute its judgment as to 
the proper balance for that of Massachusetts where the State has passed legislation 
reasonably designed to further First Amendment interests in the context of the political arena 
where the expertise of legislators is at its peak and that of judges is at its very lowest.”). 
98. 440 U.S. 173 (1979). 
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difficult to keep straight. 
 
analysis.  They are too convenient and result oriented, 
and I must endeavor to disassociate myself from them.99 
 
Justice Blackmun, at least, had serious reservations about the 
application of strict scrutiny to constitutional matters. 
Notwithstanding the apparent hesitancy of some members of the 
Court to endorse tiered scrutiny, much of the confusion in Schaumburg 
was likely genuine rather than obscurantist.  The Court had not yet 
settled on a consistent application of either content analysis or tiered 
scrutiny in First Amendment cases when it decided Schaumburg, and 
the analytical difficulties posed by these emerging concepts were 
compounded by the Court’s newfound acceptance of commercial 
speech.  Virginia Board of Pharmacy announced that commercial speech 
would receive some kind of protection, ostensibly something more than 
the rational basis scrutiny that the Court had previously applied to 
commercial speech regulation.100  But Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n 
made clear that commercial speech would not receive the same 
protection as other protected speech.101  Schaumburg introduced 
another complexity by insisting that charitable solicitation was not 
simply commercial speech because it “[did] more than inform private 
economic decisions and [was] not primarily concerned with providing 
information about the characteristics and costs of goods and services.”102  
But nor was there any indication that charitable solicitation was core 
political speech.  Taken together, Schaumburg and the commercial 
speech cases meant that commercial speech received something more 
than rational basis scrutiny and charitable solicitation received 
something more than the protection afforded commercial speech but 
less than that given to core political speech.103  This hierarchy pr
99. Id. at 188–89 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
100. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 779 
(1976). 
101. 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978). 
102. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). 
103. The confusion caused by these concepts was evident in footnote 7 of the Court’s 
opinion in Schaumburg, which noted that  
 
[t]o the extent that any of the Court’s past decisions . . . hold or indicate 
that commercial speech is excluded from First Amendment protections, 
those decisions, to that extent, are no longer good law.  For the purposes 
of applying the overbreadth doctrine, however, it remains relevant to 
distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech.   
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The emerging commercial speech doctrine also complicated content 
analysis.  By the time the Court decided Schaumburg, it was clear that a 
content-based restriction of protected speech received strict scrutiny and 
a content-neutral restriction received something less than strict scrutiny.  
But the Court’s uncertainty of how to address commercial speech and 
charitable solicitation left unclear what level of scrutiny would be 
applied to content-neutral regulations of those forms of speech.  When 
Schaumburg signaled that charitable solicitation was “fully protected 
speech,” it did so to distinguish charitable solicitation from commercial 
solicitation.104  It did not mean that regulation of charitable solicitation 
would always be subject to strict scrutiny because content analysis 
required varied levels of scrutiny for all forms of protected speech, even 
core political speech.105  Schaumburg’s avoidance of content analysis left 
unclear whether charitable solicitation always merited the same degree 
of protection as other core speech, or whether, like commercial speech, 
it sometimes fell into an ambiguous middle category.106 
Id. at 632 n.7 (citations omitted).  The Court did not explain why distinguishing between 
commercial and noncommercial speech remained relevant in the context of the overbreadth 
doctrine.   Three years earlier, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court had cryptically 
asserted that “the justification for the application of overbreadth analysis applies weakly, if at 
all, in the ordinary commercial context.”  433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977).  The only support the 
Court offered for this assertion was that “[s]ince advertising is linked to commercial 
well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by 
overbroad regulation.”  Id. at 381. 
104. The distinction was by no means nontrivial.  Tribe has highlighted the importance 
of “maintaining some residual distinctions between commercial and ideological expression on 
the ground that the former is valued only for the ‘facts’ it conveys while the latter ‘is integrally 
related to the exposition of thought—thought that may shape our concepts of the whole 
universe of man.’”  TRIBE, supra note 9, at 655 (quoting Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 779 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)).  Writing two 
years prior to Schaumburg, Tribe cautioned that distinguishing between commercial speech 
and other kinds of speech “may be needed if constitutional doctrine is to recognize the 
‘commonsense differences between speech that does no more than propose a commercial 
transaction and other varieties.’”  Id. (quoting Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24).  
Ten years later, in the second edition of his treatise, Tribe lamented that “the Court has 
repeatedly struggled with defining the differences between commercial and non-commercial 
speech, notwithstanding its offhand announcement that the difference between the two is 
based on ‘commonsense.’”  LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 894 (2d 
ed. 1988). 
105. Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 54 (1980) (“The ‘absolutely 
protected’ character of the message cannot insulate [all] forms of expression from regulation: 
context—the threat the particular expressive event poses—obviously is relevant and 
sometimes will be dispositive.”). 
106. Cf. KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1159 
(15th ed. 2004) (“[C]ommercial speech continues to stand as the lone formal exception to the 
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Unable or unwilling to synthesize the concepts before it, the Court 
failed to articulate a workable framework in Schaumburg.  Four years 
later, the Court’s significant reliance on Schaumburg in Munson 
prevented it from drawing upon more cogent developments elsewhere 
in its First Amendment jurisprudence.  This tunnel vision is particularly 
evident when Munson is compared to another First Amendment case 
decided just forty-two days earlier, Members of City Council v. 
Taxpayers for Vincent.107  Vincent involved a Los Angeles ordinance that 
prohibited the posting of signs on public property.108  Supporters of a 
local political candidate contracted with a political sign service company 
to create and post campaign signs.109  After the signs were duly removed 
by the City, the supporters and the sign company sought an injunction.110  
The Court determined that the ordinance was neutral as to viewpoint 
and then cited O’Brien for “the appropriate framework for reviewing a 
viewpoint-neutral regulation.”111  The Court concluded that the Los 
Angeles ordinance withstood O’Brien’s test and left open adequate 
alternative means of communication.112  Justice Brennan, joined by 
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dissented, explaining that: 
 
The Court’s first task is to determine whether the 
ordinance is aimed at suppressing the content of speech, 
and, if it is, whether a compelling state interest justifies 
the suppression [citing Consolidated Edison and Mosley].  
If the restriction is content-neutral, the court’s task is to 
determine (1) whether the governmental objective 
advanced by the restriction is substantial, and (2) 
whether the restriction imposed on speech is no greater 
than is essential to further that objective.  Unless both 
conditions are met the restriction must be invalidated.113 
 
two-level approach to speech set forth in Chaplinsky . . . .  [I]t enjoys First Amendment 
protection, but not as much First Amendment protection as other speech.”). 
107. 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
108. Id. at 791. 
109. Id. at 792. 
110. Id. at 793. 
111. Id. at 804. 
112. Id. at 812. 
113. Id. at 821 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Disagreeing with the Court’s intimation that the Los Angeles ordinance 
left open ample means of communication like handbill distribution,114 
Justice Brennan wrote that: 
 
The message on a posted sign remains to be seen by 
passersby as long as it is posted, while a handbill is 
typically read by a single reader and discarded. Thus, not 
only must handbills be printed in large quantity, but 
many hours must be spent distributing them.  The 
average cost of communicating by handbill is therefore 
likely to be far higher than the average cost of 
communicating by poster. For that reason, signs posted 
on public property are doubtless “essential to the poorly 
financed causes of little people,”115 and their prohibition 
constitutes a total ban on an important medium of 
communication.  Because the City has completely 
banned the use of this particular medium of 
communication, and because, given the circumstances, 
there are no equivalent alternative media that provide an 
adequate substitute, the Court must examine with 
particular care the justifications that the City proffers for 
its ban.116 
 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun thus highlighted three 
important factors in analyzing a speech restriction: (1) the need to begin 
with content analysis; (2) the appropriate test for reviewing a content-
neutral regulation; and (3) the importance of considering the potentially 
disparate effects of a regulation on “the poorly financed causes of little 
people.”117  One month later, these same three Justices joined the 
narrow majority in Munson in an opinion authored by Justice 
Blackmun.  Yet none of the doctrinal or equitable considerations from 
the Vincent dissent surfaced in Munson.118  Four years later, Riley 
alluded to disparate effects and acknowledged the need for content-
analysis but did little else to clarify the ambiguities in Schaumburg and 
Munson. 
114. Id. at 812. 
115. Justice Brennan quoted Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) 
(invalidating a city ordinance that restricted door-to-door distributions of circulars). 
116. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 820 (citations omitted). 
117. Id. at 820–21. 
118. See Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984). 
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E. Subsequent Cases 
Less than a year after Riley, the Court issued its decision in Sable 
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, striking down under strict 
scrutiny review a ban on “dial-a-porn” telephone messages that were 
indecent but not obscene.119  Sable is interesting in the present context 
not for its substantive analysis but for its formulation of strict scrutiny.  
Justice White observed that: 
 
The Government may . . . regulate the content of 
constitutionally protected speech in order to promote 
a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive 
means to further the articulated interest. . . . [T]o 
withstand constitutional scrutiny, “it must do so by 
narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those 
interests without unnecessarily interfering with First 
Amendment freedoms.” [citing Schaumburg].  It is not 
enough to show that the Government’s ends are 
compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to 
achieve those ends.120 
 
Because Justice White had authored Schaumburg, his citation to that 
case as part of his strict scrutiny analysis in Sable added further support 
to the view that Riley’s “exacting scrutiny” (derived from Schaumburg) 
was actually strict scrutiny. 
The Court’s only substantive post-Riley discussion of Schaumburg’s 
charitable solicitation principles came one year after Sable in United 
States v. Kokinda.121  Kokinda involved a challenge to a Postal Service 
119. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989). 
120. Id. at 126. 
121. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).  Other than Sable and Kokinda, the Court has cited 
Schaumburg only seven times since Riley: Davenport v. Washington Education Ass’n, 127 S. 
Ct. 2372, 2382 (2007) (citing Schaumburg for overbreadth doctrine); McConnell v. Federal 
Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 140 (2003); Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) 
(overbreadth doctrine); Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 
600, 611 (2003); Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 
U.S. 150, 163 (2002) (citing Schaumburg for principle that “our cases involving nonreligious 
speech” show that “the Jehovah’s Witnesses are not the only ‘little people’ who face the risk 
of silencing by regulations like the Village’s”); International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 677–78 (1992); and Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 
576, 581 (1989) (overbreadth doctrine).  Of these, only Madigan discusses Schaumburg in 
detail (and it leaves unaltered the Court’s approach to charitable solicitation).  538 U.S. at 
612–17.  Madigan involved a fraud prosecution of a professional charitable fundraiser.  Id. at 
617.  The Court made clear that its “opinions in Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley took care to 
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regulation that permitted charitable advocacy but not charitable 
solicitation.122  A plurality of the Court began its analysis by citing 
Schaumburg and Riley for the proposition that “[s]olicitation is a 
recognized form of speech protected by the First Amendment.”123  The 
plurality continued that “[u]nder our First Amendment jurisprudence, 
we must determine the level of scrutiny that applies to the regulation of 
protected speech at issue.”124  Applying forum analysis125 (which had not 
been at issue in Schaumburg, Munson, or Riley) and content analysis, 
the plurality concluded that the content-neutral Postal Service 
regulation governed a nonpublic forum and upheld the constitutionality 
of the regulation under rational basis scrutiny.126 
Although the Justices disagreed on the application of forum 
analysis,127 Kokinda is most interesting for its parsing of solicitation and 
advocacy.  Joined by Justice Kennedy, the plurality approved of the 
regulation’s content-neutral distinction “because solicitation is 
inherently disruptive of the Postal Service’s business.”128  In 
Schaumburg, the Court appeared to have foreclosed such an easy 
separation of solicitation and advocacy, having pronounced that 
“solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and 
perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for 
particular views on economic, political, or social issues.”129  Kokinda’s 
distinction between solicitation and advocacy is also tenuous because it 
appears to discriminate based on content.  Mosley had indicated that 
regulations making subject matter distinctions were content-based, a 
view that the Court reinforced five months after Schaumburg in 
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Service Commission of 
New York.130  In light of these cases, the Kokinda plurality’s reasoning is 
leave a corridor open for fraud actions to guard the public against false or misleading 
charitable solicitations.”  Id. 
122. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 722–23. 
123. Id. at 725. 
124. Id. 
125. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); 
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302–03 (1974). 
126. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 732–33. 
127. See, e.g., id. at 741 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
128. Id. at 732 (plurality opinion).  The issue of content analysis provoked an extended 
exchange between the plurality and the dissent.  See id. at 733–36; id. at 753–54, 760 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
129. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). 
130. 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (“[A] constitutionally permissible time, place, or manner 
restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.”).  
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens questioned this assertion, arguing that 
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questionable.  It is unlikely, for example, that a regulation excluding 
religious advocacy would have been subjected to rational basis scrutiny 
simply because the Postal Service believed that religious advocacy was 
more disruptive than other forms of advocacy. 
IV. A NEW TEST FOR CHARITABLE SOLICITATION 
I have argued above that the Court’s failure to incorporate the 
concepts of content analysis and tiered scrutiny in Schaumburg, 
Munson, and Riley and the ambiguous relationship between charitable 
solicitation and commercial speech have produced an ill-defined test for 
reviewing charitable solicitation regulation.  The Court exacerbated 
these problems with its decisions in Sable and Kokinda, which modified 
its approach to charitable solicitation with the seemingly contradictory 
suggestions that: (1) Schaumburg had applied strict scrutiny to a 
regulation governing charitable solicitation; and (2) charitable 
solicitation was less protected than Schaumburg had implied.131 
The best way to bring a more coherent approach to judicial review of 
charitable solicitation regulation is to reconcile Schaumburg with 
current understandings of content analysis, tiered scrutiny, and 
commercial speech.  In doing so, we should also take care to recognize 
the value of charitable solicitation in a democratic polity, the kind of 
normative concern that can too easily be lost in rigid application of 
doctrinal formulas.  With these doctrinal and normative concerns in 
 
every lawyer who has read . . . our cases upholding various restrictions on 
speech with specific reference to subject matter must recognize the 
hyperbole in [Mosley’s] dictum: ‘But, above all else, the First Amendment 
means that the government has no power to restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’ 
Id. at 545 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).  Stone’s 1978 article intimated that subject 
matter restrictions were in some “intermediate position” between content-based and content-
neutral restrictions and might be “properly subject to a more variable sort of analysis.”  
Stone, supra note 6, at 100; see id. at 83.  More recently, the Court has been less than clear 
about subject matter distinctions.  Compare Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) 
(“Regulation of the subject matter of messages, though not as obnoxious as viewpoint-based 
regulation, is also an objectionable form of content-based regulation”) with id. at 724 (A 
regulation that distinguishes between speech activities likely to have the consequences against 
which it seeks to protect and speech activities unlikely to have those consequences “cannot be 
struck down for failure to maintain ‘content neutrality.’”). 
131. One way to reconcile these two developments is to characterize Schaumburg as a 
strict scrutiny test of a content-based regulation, which would mean that a content-neutral 
regulation like that at issue in Kokinda would be subject to a lesser degree of scrutiny.  
Schaumburg’s lack of any content analysis makes this characterization difficult to sustain. 
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mind, I argue for a more flexible approach to charitable solicitation 
regulation rooted in a balancing of interests.  I turn now to the project of 
constructing that approach. 
A. The First Amendment Value of Charitable Solicitation 
I base my approach to charitable solicitation regulation on a “civic 
conception of free speech” that pays particular attention to forms of 
speech that advance self-governance and democratic discourse.132  From 
this framework, I suggest that regulation of charitable solicitation should 
be carefully scrutinized for three reasons: (1) the link between 
charitable solicitation and advocacy; (2) the inequalities among different 
kinds of charitable organizations; and (3) the disparate effects of 
content-neutral regulation on smaller and less popular charitable 
organizations. 
1. Solicitation and Advocacy 
One of the challenges of a civic conception of the First Amendment 
is brought to light when the government regulates speech in order to 
protect the privacy interests of an unwilling listener.133  Two seemingly 
incommensurable interests—speech and privacy—are pitted against 
each other, and we must consider what factors should be considered in 
striking an appropriate balance between these interests.  Settled 
doctrine points to the location in which the speech occurs as one factor 
to consider.134  A more civic-minded approach might also consider the 
content of the speech—the degree to which the speech contributes to 
the democratic project.  But a civic approach goes beyond even this 
instrumental value.  As Robert Post has suggested: 
 
To include speech within public discourse is to signify 
that it is constitutionally valued not merely for the 
132. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 28.  Sunstein links this civic conception to Justice Louis 
Brandeis’s famous concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring).  Sunstein describes Justice Brandeis’s theory as rooted in “classical republican 
thought, with its emphasis on political virtue, on public-spiritedness, on public deliberation, 
and on the relationship between character and citizenship.”  SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 27. 
133. The privacy interests of an individual were famously advanced by Justice Brandeis 
and his law partner, Sam Warren.  See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890) (defining privacy as the right “to be let alone”). 
134. For example, the Court has observed that the government’s interest “in protecting 
the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free 
and civilized society,” and that “[o]ne important aspect of residential privacy is protection of 
the unwilling listener.”  Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988). 
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contribution it may make to public discussion, but also, 
intrinsically, for the engagement it represents in the 
public life of a nation.  A democracy cannot flourish 
unless its citizens actively participate in the formation of 
its public opinion.  Such participation is “precious” and 
to be encouraged for its own sake.135 
 
The civic importance of charitable solicitation stems partly from the 
link between solicitation and advocacy.  Even the act of solicitation can 
itself be a form of advocacy.  In Schaumburg, the Court stated that 
“solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and 
perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for 
particular views on economic, political, or social issues, and . . . without 
solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely 
cease.”136  Solicitation is also linked to advocacy because solicitation may 
fund speech undertaken on a separate occasion.  Justice Scalia alluded 
to this in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission: “an attack upon 
the funding of speech is an attack upon speech itself.”137 
These observations hold not only for charitable solicitation but also 
for other forms of solicitation, including commercial solicitation and 
panhandling.  Is there a principled distinction between these latter forms 
of solicitation—neither of which receives elevated First Amendment 
135. Post, supra note 41, at 20.  Post contends that the Court’s charitable solicitation 
cases hold “that charitable solicitations are part of public discourse rather than commercial 
speech.”  Id. at 20 n.86. 
136. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980); see 
also Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988) (criticizing the state’s 
assumption that “the charity derive[d] no benefit from funds collected but not turned over to 
it” because “where the solicitation is combined with the advocacy and dissemination of 
information, the charity reaps a substantial benefit from the act of solicitation itself”).  The 
Court provided an example of an organization whose advocacy interests are directly 
advanced by solicitation in Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 
600, 622 n.11 (2003) (“Telephone solicitors retained by [Mothers Against Drunk Driving] 
‘reach millions of people a year, and each call educates the public about the tragedy of drunk 
driving, provides statistics and asks the customer to always designate a sober driver.’”). 
137. 540 U.S. 93, 253 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice 
Scalia cited Schaumburg and several other cases to support his contention.  See also TRIBE, 
supra note 104, at 829–30  (“Solicitation of contributions, wherever it takes place” is an 
activity that has “historically been recognized as inextricably intertwined with speech or 
petition” and its regulation “must therefore be assessed with particular sensitivity to the 
possible constriction of that breathing space which freedom of speech requires in the society 
contemplated by the first amendment.”); Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 45 (“Central to any 
meaningful right of speech are the resources necessary to exercise the right.”). 
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protection—and nonfraudulent charitable solicitation?138  In Young v. 
New York City Transit Authority, the Second Circuit suggested that 
panhandling failed to implicate core First Amendment values: 
 
The only message that we are able to [discern] as 
common to all acts of begging is that beggars want to 
exact money from those whom they accost.  While we 
acknowledge that [subway] passengers generally 
understand this generic message, we think it falls far 
outside the scope of protected speech under the First 
Amendment.  We certainly do not consider it as a 
“means indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth.”139 
 
The Supreme Court expressed a similar view about commercial speech 
in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, observing that commercial speech 
was afforded “a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its 
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.”140 
These distinctions are not impervious to challenge.  Young was 
written over a vigorous dissent from Judge Meskill, who noted that the 
panhandler plaintiffs had stated in affidavits that “they often speak with 
potential donors about subjects such as the problems of the homeless 
and poor, the perceived inefficiency of the social service system in New 
York and the dangerous nature of the public shelters in which they 
sometimes sleep.”141  Jed Rubenfeld has similarly posited that begging is 
political speech “from a certain, perfectly plausible point of view 
sounding in political theory, sociology, and so on.”142  But Sunstein 
offers a different perspe
 
138. The state can always regulate fraudulent charitable solicitation.  See Madigan, 538 
U.S. at 612 (“Like other forms of public deception, fraudulent charitable solicitation is 
unprotected speech.”). 
139. 903 F.2d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 1990). 
140. 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). 
141. Young, 903 F.2d at 165 (Meskill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
142. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 801 (2001); 
see also Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and the 
Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 899 (1991) (“The beggar may describe in her plea why 
she has been forced to beg, and the begging may lead to a discussion of larger issues.  But 
even if the beggar conveys nothing more than that she wants the listener to give her money, 
this information contributes to the collective search for truth.”). 
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t that different values are placed on different 
cat
any 
charitable organizations but not to commercial entities or beggars.146 
2. 
when oral, are inherently fragile—each contact involves competition for 
 
[I]t is plausible to think that almost all speech is political 
in the sense that it relates in some way to the existing 
social and political structure.  Commercial speech and 
obscenity are examples.  But if some people understand 
the speech in question to be political, it cannot follow 
that the speech qualifies as such for constitutional 
purposes, without treating almost all speech as 
143
 
Elsewhere, Sunstein observes that the absence of constitutional 
protection for some forms of speech “owes at least something to the 
common-sense judgmen
egories of speech.”144 
Although my contention that there is a principled distinction 
between charitable and other forms of solicitation is contestable, it is no 
less plausible than any line-drawing short of absolutism.145  Moreover, 
my distinction tracks similar demarcations made elsewhere, notably, in 
the federal tax code, which extends favorable benefits to m
The Distinctions Within Charitable Solicitation 
As a practical matter, charities compete for limited financial 
resources with unequal ability.  As the umbrella organization 
Independent Sector argued in its amicus brief in Riley: “[s]olicitations 
and communications about the substance of a charity’s work, especially 
143. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 132. 
144. Id. at 125. 
145. Justice Brandeis, for example, argued that the government could abrogate the right 
of free speech “in order to protect the state from destruction or from serious injury, political, 
economic or moral.”  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring).  Justice Brandeis provides a partial answer as to when the protection of the state 
might justify a restraint on speech: The evil should be “so imminent that it may befall before 
there is opportunity for full discussion.  If there be time to expose through discussion the 
falsehoods and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be 
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.  Only an emergency can justify repression.”  Id. 
at 377.  This, of course, only bounds the indeterminacy; it does not eliminate it.  (What is an 
emergency?  Who decides imminence?  What constitutes a falsehood, and by whose 
standards?)  Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 149 (“There is no way to operate a system of free 
expression without drawing lines.”). 
146. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(1)–(28) (2006) (containing extensive definitions as to which 
entities qualify as “exempt organizations”). 
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the citizen’s limited time, attention and money.”147  Leslie Espinoza 
makes a similar contention, noting that “at least theoretically, there is to 
some extent a limited ‘pool’ of potential charitable contributions.”148  
According to Espinoza, this constraint became visible in the years 
following World War II, when “[e]xponential growth in communication 
and the mechanization of solicitation, both through direct mail appeals 
and telephone appeals, opened new opportunities to reach donors and 
increased competition for contributions.”149  Because increased 
competition “lowered the revenues of established charities,”150 these 
charities “consciously promoted” fund-raising limits “to restrict diversity 
and competitiveness within the charitable community.”151  Under 
Espinoza’s thesis, the states, persuaded by larger established charities to 
enact greater regulation, actually diminished the diversity of viewpoints 
in the charitable sector. 
Espinoza’s perspective is consistent with the Court’s observation 
that regulation of professional charitable solicitation disproportionately 
affects small or unpopular charities.152  These charities include law 
enforcement foundations, veterans groups, and social advocacy groups 
whose purposes are unmistakably among those of core political speech: 
endorsing legislation, promoting messages and programs in the interest 
of public welfare and safety, and furthering the causes of marginalized 
groups.  Regulations that vanquish these voices from the public square, 
whether directly or indirectly, endanger “those processes of 
communication that must remain open to the participation of citizens if 
democratic legitimacy is to be maintained.”153 
147. Brief for Independent Sector et al. as Amici Curiae supporting Appellees, Riley v. 
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (No. 87-328). (“Amici include advocacy 
organizations (of all political stripes), who also must overcome many citizens’ discomfort with 
troubling issues and viewpoints.  Accordingly, any compelled disclosure, especially when on a 
topic not chosen by the organization, tends to chill free speech by diverting the citizen’s 
attention and undercutting the good will that links solicitor and citizen.”). 
148. Espinoza, supra note 81, at 654. 
149. Id. at 635. 
150. Id. at 654. 
151. Id. at 610.  Espinoza highlights the protectionist bias of established charities that 
was evident in a report issued by an ad hoc committee of academics and representatives from 
corporations and nonprofit organizations.  Id. at 650.  This report advocated that service-
oriented charities would be better off with “a smaller number and a greater joint effort.”  Id. 
at 651 (quoting VOLUNTARY HEALTH AND WELFARE AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES: 
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY BY AN AD HOC CITIZENS COMMITTEE 30 (R. Hamlin ed., 1961)). 
152. Riley, 487 U.S. at 799. 
153. Post, supra note 41, at 7. 
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3. The Disparate Effects of Content-Neutral Regulation 
Regulation of charitable solicitation will seldom if ever be content-
based under the current test for content analysis articulated in Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism.154  The government will rarely attempt to regulate 
charitable solicitation out of disagreement with the message it conveys, 
but will typically do so in order to advance government interests 
unrelated to the content of expression such as public safety, fraud 
prevention, or residential privacy.155  Accordingly, these regulations will 
be subject to less than strict scrutiny.156  But putative distinctions 
between content-neutral and content-based regulations threaten 
diversity in the charitable sector because, as Kenneth Karst has 
observed, “regulations that are formally neutral as to speech content” 
may result in “de facto content discrimination.”157  Justice Marshall, 
joined by Justice Brennan, expressed a similar concern in his dissent in 
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, decided three days 
before Munson. 
 
[T]he Court has dramatically lowered its scrutiny of 
governmental regulations once it has determined that 
[time, place, and manner] regulations are 
content-neutral.  The result has been the creation of a 
two-tiered approach to First Amendment cases: while 
regulations that turn on the content of the expression are 
154. 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
155. Government regulation of professional charitable solicitation may take the form of 
subject-matter or speaker-based restrictions, but will seldom be viewpoint-discriminatory. 
156. Of course, a regulation deemed to be content-based under Ward would be subject 
to strict scrutiny and would likely be unsustainable. 
157. Karst, supra note 13, at 35, 37.  Karst viewed this kind of discrimination as 
“presumptively invalid” under the First Amendment’s “equality principle.”  Id. at 37.  For 
Karst, “[t]he principle of equality, when understood to mean equal liberty, is not just a 
peripheral support for the freedom of expression, but rather part of the ‘central meaning of 
the First Amendment.’”  Id. at 21 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 
(1964)).  A showing “that a formally neutral law has discriminatory effect deserves great 
weight in persuading a court to look closely at the necessity for the regulation.”  Id. at 39.  For 
more on the concept of de facto differential effects of content-neutral regulations, see 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 171 (Some content-neutral restrictions “may foreclose important 
expressive outlets and have profound content-differential effects.”); TRIBE, supra note 9, at 
682–83 (“Even a wholly neutral government regulation or policy, aimed entirely at harms 
unconnected with the content of any communication, may be invalid if it leaves too little 
breathing space for communicative activity, or leaves people with too little access to channels 
of communication, whether as would-be speakers or would-be listeners.” (emphasis in 
original)); Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 38, at 221 (There 
can be “de facto content-differential effects of content-neutral restrictions.”). 
INAZU 12 4/14/2009  3:23:35 PM 
582 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [92:551 
 
subjected to a strict form of judicial review, regulations 
that are aimed at matters other than expression receive 
only a minimal level of scrutiny.  The minimal scrutiny 
prong of this two-tiered approach has led to an 
unfortunate diminution of First Amendment protection.  
By narrowly limiting its concern to whether a given 
regulation creates a content-based distinction, the Court 
has seemingly overlooked the fact that content-neutral 
restrictions are also capable of unnecessarily restricting 
protected expressive activity.158 
 
Justice Marshall elaborated in a footnote: 
 
[A] content-neutral regulation does not necessarily fall 
with random or equal force upon different groups or 
different points of view.  A content-neutral regulation 
that restricts an inexpensive mode of communication will 
fall most heavily upon relatively poor speakers and the 
points of view that such speakers typically espouse.159 
 
The problem with contemporary scrutiny of content-neutral 
regulations is that it focuses on the legitimacy of the government’s 
action but ignores the impact of the regulation on the speaker.  As 
Stephen Gottlieb has argued, the Court’s adoption of neutrality “shifted 
its gaze” from the behavior of the speaker which meant that “many 
problems, such as . . . limitations on access to information and access to 
opportunities for political broadcast and inexpensive speech, [became] 
relatively less visible.”160  Once the perspective shifted from the behavior 
of the speaker to the behavior of government, “governmental interests 
no longer had to be particularly weighty; they only had to be pure.”161 
158. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 312–13 (1984) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
159. Id. at 313 n.14; see also Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 38, at 57 
(“[T]he Court long has recognized that by limiting the availability of particular means of 
communication, content-neutral restrictions can significantly impair the ability of individuals 
to communicate their views to others.  This is a central first amendment concern: to the extent 
that content-neutral restrictions actually have this effect, they necessarily dampen the search 
for truth, impede meaningful participation in self-governance, and frustrate individual 
self-fulfillment.”); cf. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 38, at 
192 n.5. 
160. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 34. 
161. Id. at 36. 
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In the area of charitable solicitation, the more burdensome 
regulations usually threaten less established charities.  The reason for 
this inverse relationship is unsurprising: large charities often have either 
an established donor base or sufficient in-house employees or 
volunteers to conduct solicitations; small or unpopular charities, 
particularly those without a donor base or name recognition, often have 
to undergo the “necessary evil” of relying on professional charitable 
solicitors.162  The Supreme Court has also recognized this reality, noting 
that some disfavored methods of solicitation are “essential to the poorly 
financed causes of little people”163 and that “small or unpopular 
charities” must “usually rely on professional fundraisers.”164  The 
disparate effects of regulating charitable solicitation thus endanger the 
very speakers that the First Amendment should most staunchly protect.  
A civic conception of the First Amendment requires scrutiny of even a 
content-neutral regulation to ensure that any disparate effects are 
considered in light of the democratic project at stake. 
B. The Need for Balancing 
Kathleen Sullivan has observed that “[t]he suspension of categorical 
reasoning in favor of [intermediate scrutiny] typically comes about from 
a crisis in analogical reasoning” when “[a] set of cases comes along that 
just can’t be steered readily onto the strict scrutiny or the rationality 
track.”165  Schaumburg and its progeny fall within Sullivan’s 
observation.166  As a practical matter, strict scrutiny of charitable 
solicitation regulation is implausible under the Court’s current 
framework for content analysis because a regulation will almost never 
162. See Note, Developments in the Law—Nonprofit Corporations (pt. 4), 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1634, 1635 (1992). 
163. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943). 
164. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 799 (1988). 
165. Kathleen Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297–98 (1992) (“‘Intermediate scrutiny,’ unlike the poles 
of the two-tier system, is an overtly balancing mode. . . . Where intermediate scrutiny governs, 
the outcome is no longer foreordained at the threshold.  Instead of winning always or never, 
the government may sometimes win or sometimes lose—it all depends.”); see also Bendix 
Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“We sometimes make . . . ‘balancing’ judgments in determining how far the needs of the 
State can intrude upon the liberties of the individual, but that is of the essence of the courts’ 
function as the nonpolitical branch.” (citation omitted)).  But cf. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 583 
(Strict scrutiny also involves a kind of balancing.). 
166. Sullivan also points out that balancing has been vituperated by both liberal and 
conservative jurists in different political contexts.  Sullivan, supra note 165, at 316–17. 
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be aimed at the content of the charitable message itself.167  More 
substantively, strict scrutiny could hinder the state from protecting 
important interests like fraud prevention and residential privacy.  
Rational basis scrutiny, on the other hand, fails to account for the 
fundamental speech interests at stake in charitable solicitation.168  
Balancing, as an alternative, “tends to make the articulation and 
comparison of competing rights and interests more explicit.”169  A 
carefully constructed balancing test—despite the risk inherent in the 
discretion it leaves to individual judges—may be preferable to either of 
the more rigid alternatives of strict or rational basis scrutiny.170 
C. Formulating a New Test 
A judicial test for the regulation of charitable solicitation should 
account for the concerns identified above.  It should also reflect the 
principles of content analysis and tiered scrutiny now ensconced in First 
Amendment law.  I turn now to constructing such a test, using as a 
starting point the Eighth Circuit’s decision in National Federation of the 
Blind of Arkansas, Inc. v. Pryor.171 
Pryor involved a challenge to an Arkansas statute that required a 
telephone charitable solicitor to end the solicitation when requested to 
do so by the recipient of the call.172  After examining Schaumburg and 
Ward, the Eighth Circuit noted that the standards enunciated in those 
cases were “obviously very similar.”173  Without explicitly announcing its 
167. Even regulations that distinguish between professional charitable solicitors and in-
house solicitors are at most speaker-based restrictions, which “are not always considered the 
practical equivalent of content restrictions, so long as the ground on which speakers are 
classified can be described as related to some aspect of their status independent of their 
beliefs or points of view.”  SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 106, at 1199.  Similarly, 
regulations restricting charitable solicitation as a whole are at most subject matter restrictions, 
a classification that might be subject to “a more variable sort of analysis.”  Stone, supra note 
6, at 100. 
168. See Espinoza, supra note 81, at 612. 
169. Sullivan, supra note 165, at 301. 
170. Ely observed that “balancing tests inevitably become intertwined with the 
ideological predispositions of those doing the balancing—or if not that, at least with the 
relative confidence or paranoia of the age in which they are doing it—and we must build 
barriers as secure as words are able to make them.”  Ely, supra note 18, at 1501.  Ely was 
writing specifically about regulations that proscribe messages because they are dangerous, 
and although my invocation of his words decontextualizes the quote, the abstracted principle 
retains its importance. 
171. 258 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2001). 
172. Id. at 854. 
173. Id. at 855. 
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own test, the court reviewed: (1) whether the state had a legitimate 
interest; (2) whether the interest was significantly furthered by a 
regulation narrowly tailored to meet that interest; and (3) whether the 
regulation substantially limited charitable solicitation.174  These 
principles may be reformulated as follows: 
 
A content-neutral regulation of charitable solicitation 
will be sustained if the regulation furthers a legitimate 
interest and the interest is significantly furthered by a 
narrowly tailored regulation that does not substantially 
limit charitable solicitation.175 
 
The critical prong of the Pryor test is whether the regulation 
“substantially limits” charitable solicitation.  This emphasis forces a 
balancing of interests because it examines the degree of the burden that 
the government’s regulation places on charitable speech.  But while 
Pryor comes closer to a workable standard than Schaumburg, it remains 
unsatisfactory for three reasons: 
 
1.  Pryor unnecessarily expands an already subjective intermediate 
scrutiny review by supplanting Turner’s “important or substantial” 
interest with a “sufficient or legitimate” interest that hovers closer to 
rational basis scrutiny than to an elevated standard of review.  Although 
the important or substantial formulation is itself malleable and subject 
to abuse, terminology consistent with precedent provides a modicum of 
accountability. 
2.  Pryor’s use of the phrase “significantly furthers” unnecessarily 
introduces an additional subjective factor to the test.  If a regulation is 
narrowly tailored to advance an important or substantial interest, a 
subjective assessment of the degree to which the regulation advances 
that interest adds little substantive value to the test.  The “significantly 
furthers” inquiry can also unwittingly slip a strict scrutiny standard into 
an intermediate scrutiny review.  Suppose an unchallenged law requires 
a charity to disclose X in order to advance the state’s interest in 
preventing fraud.  Suppose further that a new law requiring the 
compelled disclosure of X + Y is challenged on First Amendment 
174. Id. at 855–56. 
175. Id. at 854–55.  Although my formulation differs slightly from the test explicated by 
the court at the beginning of Pryor, it is consistent with the language used by the court in its 
substantive analysis. 
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grounds.  Assuming that both regulations are content-neutral, the state 
need not show that X + Y is the least restrictive means of advancing its 
interest in fraud prevention.  But if X + Y must significantly further the 
state’s interest, the charity could argue that, given the existence of X, 
the marginal benefit of Y does not significantly further that interest.  
This leaves the state with justification only for disclosure of X.  The 
charity thus indirectly forces the state to comply with a standard more 
akin to a least restrictive strict scrutiny despite the content-neutrality of 
the regulation.176 
3.  Pryor’s “substantial limitation” component tilts too restrictively 
against the government.  By intimating that a regulation cannot 
substantially limit charitable solicitation, Pryor introduces a near-
absolute presumption reminiscent of strict scrutiny.  Some content-
neutral regulations may justifiably substantially limit or even foreclose 
charitable solicitation, just as some content-neutral regulations limit 
other forms of protected speech.  Precluding the government from any 
regulation that substantially limits solicitation skews the balance against 
the government’s ability to regulate. 
 
Pryor’s test can be modified to address the three concerns described 
above by: (1) replacing “sufficient or legitimate” with “important or 
substantial”; (2) removing the “significantly furthers” requirement; and 
(3) adding a balancing component that is effectuated if the regulation 
substantially limits charitable solicitation.  These adjustments produce 
the following test: 
 
A content-neutral regulation of charitable solicitation 
will be sustained if it furthers an important or substantial 
interest through a narrowly tailored regulation that does 
not substantially limit charitable solicitation (unless the 
harm the regulation prevents clearly outweighs the harm 
caused by the regulation’s limitation).177 
176. A similar critique can be made of the commercial speech test developed in Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 561–
66 (1980).  Under Central Hudson’s second prong, the government “must demonstrate that 
the challenged regulation ‘advances the Government’s interest “in a direct and material 
way.”’”  Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625–26 (1995) (quoting Rubin v. Coors 
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993))). 
177. Although I confine this proposed test to the scope of this Article—charitable 
solicitation—the test has potentially broader applicability as a modification of the 
intermediate scrutiny formulation in Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 
661–62 (1994). 
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This test, of course, introduces its own vagaries.  But premised on the 
need for a balancing of interests, it is a more transparent representation 
of that balancing.  It also invites courts to consider the potentially 
disparate effects of content-neutral restrictions. 
The balancing component in the parenthetical of the proposed test is 
conditional: it operates only when a regulation substantially limits 
charitable solicitation.  A narrowly tailored content-neutral regulation 
that furthers an important or substantial government interest should be 
upheld if its limitation on charitable solicitation is insubstantial.  But the 
substantial limitation requirement operates as a check against my 
elimination of Pryor’s requirement that a regulation significantly further 
the government interest.  Consider again a disclosure requirement X.  
Removing the “significantly furthers” requirement allows the state to 
regulate X + Y even if Y is only marginally effective and therefore 
protects my test from becoming a de facto least restrictive means test.  
But left unchecked, the state could rely on this rationale to require 
disclosure of X + Y + Z and beyond.  At some point, the aggregate 
effect of these disclosures may cause considerable harm to a charity.  
The substantial limitation language forces the parenthetical balancing 
test when this occurs.  When a court concludes that the limitation is 
substantial, the balancing test favors the charitable speech over the 
restriction by requiring that the harm prevented by the regulation 
clearly outweigh the harm that it causes.  This initial position accords 
with a speech-protective view and signals to legislatures that they must 
account for the speaker’s interests in crafting their regulations. 
The balancing component also recasts the government’s stake from 
the importance of the government interest to the harm that the 
regulation prevents.  The focus on harm encompasses both the gravity of 
the government’s interest and the regulation’s effectiveness in furthering 
that interest. In this way, the parenthetical in my proposed test 
recaptures the “significantly furthers” aspect of Pryor, but this inquiry is 
only made when the regulation substantially limits speech. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although I have argued for a test that more adequately protects the 
values of charitable solicitation, the Court’s test is ostensibly already 
speech-protective: Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley all struck down 
attempts to regulate charitable solicitation.  My critique, however, is 
structural rather than results-oriented.  I have argued that the test 
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derived from Schaumburg lacks coherence, clarity, and doctrinal 
sustainability.  The most direct support for my contention is the inability 
of lower courts even to agree whether the Court’s test is one of strict 
scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny.  When interpreted as the former, the 
test is inconsistent with the application of content analysis in other areas 
of speech regulation.  When interpreted as the latter, Schaumburg fails 
to account adequately for the civic interests at stake with charitable 
speech.  My concern is the same that Robert Post has expressed with 
respect to commercial speech: 
 
Commercial speech doctrine is now almost a quarter of a 
century old.  Yet in all that time it has never 
systematically queried its own justifications and 
implications.  By settling quickly and easily into a test 
whose bland provisions were indifferent to a disciplined 
account of the constitutional value of commercial speech, 
the doctrine has allowed fundamental differences of 
perspective to fester and increase.  These differences 
now threaten to explode the doctrine entirely.178 
 
My aim has been to propose an alternative test that reflects greater 
clarity and transparency.179  My argument has been chiefly analytical, 
but it also contains a normative element: the Court’s inability to 
establish a coherent test has exposed an important form of speech to an 
unwarranted risk of overregulation.  This assertion flows from my view 
that the protections of the First Amendment should be at their highest 
for political speech and that charitable solicitation is a kind of political 
speech.  I have thus adopted a broader conception of political speech 
than some.  But I have also argued for principled line-drawing that 
prevents an exceptional category of speech from being swallowed by the 
whole.  Thus, for example, I have contended that neither begging nor 
commercial speech warrant the same level of protection that should be 
extended to charitable solicitation.  Others might argue that both of 
those forms of speech contribute to a rich and diverse civic discourse as 
much as charitable solicitation.  These discussions need to be taking 
place with greater frequency.  Principled distinctions between different 
forms of speech, and even distinctions between speech and non-speech, 
have become increasingly thin.  To take but one obvious example, we 
178. Post, supra note 41, at 54–55. 
179. Cf. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63 (rev. ed. 1969) (“The desideratum 
of clarity represents one of the most essential ingredients of legality.”). 
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have amply demonstrated that, when it comes to pornography, we 
haven’t known it when we’ve seen it.180 
Evolving technology will ensure that the regulation of charitable 
solicitation remains a timely legal issue,181 and First Amendment 
jurisprudence must be capacious enough to resolve unforeseen 
challenges as the speech interests underlying charitable solicitation 
continue to intersect in new ways with competing interests.  Left 
unaltered, Schaumburg’s test may be incapable of meeting those 
challenges; indeed, it may be reduced to an “abstract concept” that 
becomes “filled with whatever content and direction one can manage to 
put into [it].” 182 
180. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
181. See, e.g., FTC v. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 855 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(upholding distinction between charitable and commercial solicitation under the national do-
not-call registry); see also First Spam and Spim, Now ‘Spit:’ VoIP Annoyance Defies 
Regulatory Categorization, 73 U.S. LAW WEEK, Nov. 30, 2004, at 2316 (describing “spit” as “a 
next-generation annoyance that delivers unsolicited commercial messages to users of Internet 
telephony”). 
182. STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD 
THING, TOO 102 (1994). 
